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TOO-CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF THE THIRD-PARTY KIND:
WILL THE LIABILITY CONVENTION STAND THE TEST OF THE COSMOS 2251IRIDIUM 33 COLLISION?
Frans G. von der Dunk
University of Nebraska, College of Law, Space and Telecommunications Law Program
Fvonderdunk2@unl.edu

space law regime may need elabor~tion
alld refinement to deal with such
incidents in an optimal fashion.

Abstract
Cynics would say: space lawyers nlust
have been waiting for this for decades,
and now will of course iInmediately
call for additional regulation. But
indeed, the recent collision between
the Cosmos 2251 and the Iridium 33
satellite, the first time since the
Cosmos 954 disintegrated over Canada
that the Liability Convention stands a
chance of officially being invoked,
raises a number of issues regarding the
applicability of that Convention, and
tIle level of precision with whicll it can
be applied.
The present paper undertakes a critical
analysis of some of these issues.
Notably, this concerns the involvement
of a cOInmercial satellite run by a
private .operator in the collision (the
Liability Convention providing for a
very nluch state-oriented liability
regime), the issue of 'fault' as
detcnninative of the level of liability of
the two principal states involved in the
collision, alld the concept of 'space
debris' - as Cosnlos 2251 was
apparently non-operational and out of
control for more than thirteen years and what to do with it legally, in tenns
of liability as well as otherwise.
In view of the gradually growing
population of alIter space with manmade artefacts the Cosmos 2251Iridium 33 unfortunately but very
likely will not be the last too-close
encounter of this third-party kind. And
cynics or not, lawyers will have to
address the extent to which the CUlTent

1. The facts of the collision
On 10 February 2009 the Cosnlos 2251
and Iridium 33 satellites collided at an
altitude of some 785 kilometres 'above'
Northern Siberia, presumably with a
relative velocity of at least several
hundreds
of
miles
per
hour,
iInmediately transfomling at least one
of the Iridium's mobile telephony
nodes as well as all of the Russian
satellite into a debris cloud likely to
remain in orbit for at least decades. I
Iridium 33 was a comnlercial telecom
satellite owned by a US private
company, even if de.facto its operations
were sustained by the US military as an
anchor custonler. Cosmos 2251 was a
Russian military satellite also used for
telecommunications.
Cosmos 2251 had been launched in
June 1993 from Plesetsk in Russia, by
the Russian Space Agency on top of a
Proton vehicle, and registered by means
of a note verbale with the United
2
Nations in June 1994. The satellite,
however, had become defunct and presumably - completely out of control
3
during 1995. Iridium 33 had been
launched together with six other
Iridiunl satellites in September 1997 on
a Proton launch
vehicle
froIn
Bajkonour, the Russia-nln spaceport in
Kazakhstan, of which Russia informed
4
the United Nations in March 1998.
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dispute settlell1cnt procedure t]lat that
provided for in tIle COllventioll.
The GIlly case \vhere., so far, the
Ljability Convention has been formally
applied, even if only explicitly referred
to in the claimant's statementl()~ the
disintegration of the Soviet Cosmos
954 satellite over Canada in 1978, inter
alia illustrates this very point. In the
final document settling the dispute it
was agreed by the Soviet Union to pay
an amount of C~$ 3~OOO,OOO ex gratitI -and the final document itself did not
Inention the I~iability Convention. 11
It should be pointed out that in the
present case the Liability Convention
has not (yet) been invoked by either
party (neither has any other potentially
liability dispute settlement regill1e been
so invoked), but once it \vould be, such
invocation would ill11nediately be seen
not to lead to easy and autonlatic
solutions and results. There are (at
least)
three
interrelated
aspects
complicating any such application.,
~lllich
\vill be discussed in the
following three sections.

2. TIle collision and the Liability
Convention
There should be - and indeed is ~ little
dOllbt that liability issues arising from
the collision would first and foremost
trigger the applicability of the 1972
-L.iability Conventions. The collision
concerns two space objects involving at
least t\VO diflerent l1ations, the United
States and the Russian Federation, and
~ as will be seen - both the question of
liability as between the two respective
operators/owners, a11d the question of
liability towards allY potential further
\lictims., be they in outer space., in air
space or on earth, are principally to be
6
regulated by the Liability Convention.
Even as the Liability Convention's
application hinges on the damage being
caused by a space object, whicll in turn
is generally defined as an object

intended to be lallllched into outer
space, ill view of the altitude of the
collision there can be no doubt that it
took place in outer space making the
two satellites space objects for the
7
present purpose.
Still, it should be noted that as SUCll the
applicability of other legal regilnes for
dealing with liability claims is not to be
fundatnentally excluded. The Liability
Conventioll itself already expressly
declares that its invocation would not
stand in the way of any clailTI regarding
the sanlC event being pursued "in the
courts or administrative tribunals or
agencies of a launching State'~. R
F'urthennorc, prior to triggerillg the
application of the parts of the Liability
Convention providing for a dispute
settlement procedure, the paliies to a
dispute on liability for damage caused
by a space object are supposed to find a
through
'diplolnatic
sol-ution
9
negotiations - which nlay well include
tIle option of using other liability rules
or principles than those provided by the

3. The involvement of a COilllTIercial
satellite

Firstly, a closer look at the collision and
possible application of the Liability
Convention briIlgs the issue of the
existing lack of clarity of the proper
place of private entities in the
international space law liability regin1c
back_ on the table - the operator of the
Iridium 33 satellite., of course, \vas
IridiulTI, a private US company_
The issue is 110t so lTIuch that lridillnl
itself, in case it would consider doing
so., COllld not invToke the Liability
COllvelltion. This would be Ulldisputed
as the Convention unequivocally only
allows states to assert claillls under it. 12
In this case, therefore, IridiulTI'I being a
"juridical person" of the United States,

Liability COllvention, and/or another
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might try to convince the US
govenlment to assert a claim on its
behalf. 13
The problenls arise essentially on the
other side of the fence: if the Russian
Federation would feel like establishing
a claim under the Liability Convention,
could it do so against the United
States? The Liability Convention
clearly establishes "the launching
State" to be the liable entity for
damage caused by a space object for
which it qualifies as such a "launching
State", but only lists the four criteria
for qualifying as SUCll by reference to
"a State" - "A State which launches or
procures the launching of a space
object [or] A State from whose
territory or facility a space object is
launched". 14
Does that make the United States the
"launching State" of the Iridium 33
satellite? As stated, the launch of that
satellite was undertaken by the Russian
Space Agency on a Proton vehicle,
procured by Iridium itself (which is not
'the United States'), and took place
from
Bajkonour,
which
is
in
Kazakhstan. The only legal link
between the United States as a state and
Iridium as a company having procured
the launch of a satellite therefore is the
but
latter's
US
nationality
'nationality' of an operator is not as
such referred to in the context of the
definition of the "launching State" .15
On the other hand, various scholars
have argued that the link of nationality
would somehow make the United
States the liable entity in a case like the
present one, either as the "state which
launches" (which thus is effectively
interpreted to read 'a state which itself
launches or whose entities launch') the
relevant space object, or as the 'state
procuring the launch' somehow as if by
proxy through such nationality of the
actual entity procuril1g it. While a
further argument for legally equating

the activities of Iridium to those of the
United States as a sovereign party to
the Liability Convention could be
derived from Article VI - which makes
state
internationally
a ~. relevant
responsible as much for its own
activities in outer space as for those of
non-governmental entities - also this
argument is a matter of interpretation
deviating from the literal text of the
Convention's clause.] 6
Neither does state practice help much,
as various states have detennined the
scope of their national authorisation
regimes, supposed to take care of
domestic consequences of international
liability claims being paid out of state's
treasuries, quite differently. Some states
require entities with their nationality to
obtain a license for undertaking space
activities, others focus on other criteria
for such requirements, for example
referring to the territory from which
relevant activities are conducted. 17
In the case of the United States,
notably, the Commercial Space Launch
Act (which takes care inter alia of
international liability) in its present
iteration does require a license with
attendant obligations only for those
intending "to launch a launch vehicle
or to operate a launch site ( ... ) in the
United States", as well as any "citizen
of the United States ( ... ) [wishing] to
launch a launch vehicle or to operate a
launch site (... ) outsjde the United
States" - not, for example, to SOlneone
only operating the satellite launched
Is
and/or having ordered such launch. In
tum, the US Comm'unications Act,
which deals with the licensing of
satellite operators, does not require any
coverage of intenlational liability
claims under the Liability Convention
that the United States might be faced
with - and moreover applies its
licensing obligation only to those
undertaking their satellite operations
19
.
fjrom US terrItory.
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territory and facilities l'vould 1110ke .for
non-applicability' (~f' the Liability'
Convention to the collision at issue.
This, it should be stressed, was tl1e
consequence of the choice of the
private
US
cOll1pany
cOllcemed
without further (fannal) interference
23
by th.c US authorities - leading to the
SOl11cwhat ironic result that Russia, as
successor to a Soviet Union which had
been so vehclnently against granting
private enterprise any legal personality
under thc space treaties, would now be
fundalnentally unable to recover any
daillages
under
the
Liability
Convention as a consequence of the
Soviet Unjon's Sllccess in tllis
j4
respect ... ~
Secondly, even if Iridiu111 would have
chosen to have its satellite launched,
for exanlple.,
fro III KOllrou by
Arianespace, clainls under the Liability
Convention
should
have
been
addressed towards France and not the
United States., as an argumcllt that the
United States would be a launching
state merely on account of Iridium's
nationality, gi,ren the lack of clarity on
the illtemational level and tIle
interpretation of the United States as
elnanating from its national acts, meets
with
considerable
probably
insurmountable - problems.

Consequently,
in
the
(so
far
hypothetical) case of .Russia wishing to
pursue a liability clailTI under the
Liability Convention, this might serve
as a clinching argunlent for the United
States to deny any qualification as a
~'laullching State" with
respect to
Iridium 33.
This is further reillfore-ed by the fact
that the launch of the satellite was not
registered \vith the United Nations by
the ·United States, again providing clear
evidence that the Ullited States does not
consider itself a 'launching state,20
(whereas Russia merely lnentioned it in
the note verbale, in contrast to its also
providing for proper registration of
some other spacc objects).
More problematically still, the laLlnch
[rOlTI
Bajkonour
Inakes
both
Kazakhstan (as the state whose
territory was used for the launch) and
Russia (""hose launch facilities were so
used) into launching states for the
21
lridiunl 33. Even if the United States
would be considered a launching state,
a clainl between two launchillg states
would be thus at stake!
The Liability Conventioll, essentially
dealing wit]1 third-party liability is - to
say the least - not geared to such
scenarios. It deals \vith joint launching
state-scenarios only to the extent that
joint liability towards third parties is
concenled ~. . where it provides: "A
launching State which has paid
cOlTIpensation for danlage shall have
the right to present a claim for
indemnification to other participants in
th.c joint lallnching. The participants in
a jOillt launching may concillde
agreenlents regarding the apportioning
alnong themselves of the financial
obligation in respect of which they are
jointly and severally liable.,,22 . ~
In sum: in the end the qualification of
Russia as a launclling state also of
Iridiunl 33 to use a non-US launcll
provider laullching from nOll-US

4. TIle issue of 'fault'
The difficulties with applying tilC
Liability Convention discussed above
left asidc, it would be clear that any
liability issues under the Liability
COllvention would be a ll1atter for
Article III, as concerning "dalnage
being caused [by a space object]
elsewhere than on the surface of the
Earth to a[nother] space obj ect". In
those cases liability w'ould be
apportioned according to fault.
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PriJl1a .facie, this seems to be a very

between at least two options of
"conduct", w11ere that person whether
by "intention' or 'negligence' has
chosen an option (that is by flawed
"jttdgmcnt") leadl11g to the hann
concerned'! where choosing another
option would not have led to
harnl.
Applying this gClleric definition of
'fault' to
case at hand, however,
would lead to the cOllnter-intuitivc
conclusion that, if
entity, Iridium
would be the liable one. As was
continned by Iridiunl spokesperson
Elizabeth Mailander,
company
indeed could have moved the satellite
out of the way if
a
warning.
By contrast., ever sil1ce
(~oslnos 2251 had run out of control
years
there was
SaIne
nothing the Russians COllld have done
to 11lake
1
a collision
with Iridium
At the saIne tinle: could Russia really
hold the United
or the
29
company
conccmed
liable
for
'da111age' done to a lifeless piece
metal in outer space
the logical
conclusion of the above reasoning?
While
it might still serve SOlne
practical purposes and/or represent
SOlne real
to the OWller~ in
absence of applicability of any concepts
suel1 as 'abandonlllent' and 'salvage' in
outer
law generally speaking it is
still for the operator to make a
detennination of
In order to circum\'ent the abo've firstlc\rcl conclusion as leading "'to a resll1t
which
is
manifestly
absurd or
llnreasonable,,30 one \vould have to
nlove to a
analysis.
preSul11ption of a Cll0icc of action on
both sides does not only preSUlne actual
capability to manoeuvre, but
knowledge of a need to do 80'\ in other
words: a sound'
which to
make a "judgemcllt" in the sense of

sensible and logical approach. Space
objects are operated consciously and
knowingly, and if one of theln leaves
nominal
or
or
othcnvise starts to behave and move
it to
illto
another, the operator of the [ortner
would be held liable on the basis of
for the
by the
lattcr., whereas the operator of the latter
would in the
of fault not be
liable for an~y damage susta1tled by the
[oriller as a result of the collision"
"Fault' thus, presumably
of its
seelningly obvious clarity, was not
defined any further
yet,
first
international satelllte collislon as per
IridiulTI 33 versus Cosmos 2251 raises
questions in this
Prin1G
facie., to be sure, as varlOUS
COll1ll1entators
already pointed
out, such an analysis \vould seem to
point at liability on the Russian side, as
doubt the Cosmos
it was with
2251 that, having enjoyed a complete
of control from
ground,
strayed [raIn its original nominal orbit
so as to cross the path of the fll1ly
functioning Iridium 33.
However: 'fault' has been defined as:
'" 1"
error or
or
of conduct; any deviation fronl
prudcl1ce or duty resulting fronl
bad
inattention,
faith, or Inismanagement. ( ... ) 2. The
intcn 1i ona 1 or
to
maintain sonle standard of conduct
when that failure results ill hann to
_.. . . ,"' . . . . . _.. person.
'Fault liability' then
is ""liability based on SOl1le degree of
, alternatively "a
tYl1c of liability in which the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant's
was either
or
intentional" and as such the opposite of
strict liabi lity 2?
In other ,vords: a 'fault' preSllmes a
choice for the person at faldt, a choice
203

Published in the Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law (2009): 199-209.
Copyright 2010, Frans von der Dunk. Used by permission.

and would be able to replace the 33 on
short ~
At the same time all parties hedged
their bets, for one good reason: with
the hundreds of
of debris
(counting only the traceable ones) and
in view of their lifetime there is a
from-theoretical possibility for decades
into the future that third parties' space
objects
be damaged. This would
bring i11to play Article IV of the
Liability Convention, which states
relevant part: "In the event of dalnage
being caused elsewhere than on the
surface
Earth to a space
of one launching State or to persons or
property on board such a
by a space object of another launching
State, and of damage thereby being
caused to a third State or to its natural
or juridical persons, the first two States
shall be jointly and
liable to
the third State, to tIle extent illdicated
by the following: (... ) (b) If the
dalnage
been
to a space
object of the third State or to persons
or property on board
elsewhere than on the surface of the
Ea11h, their liability to the third . ) late
shall
on the
oj'
the ./irst fvvo 5"ftates or on the .fault qf'
wholn
either
responsible.
Note, that if
for
example - a French satellite would be
dalnaged by a piece
debris of
Iridillm-Cosmos collision, it vvould not
Inatter
the
actually be f'r01l1 the one or fron1 the
other; what matters is solely which of
the two was at fault
the primary
collision.
Mutatis
saIne would
apply in case of third-party dalnage on
earth, for which as SUCll absolute
liability would apply, but the issue
fault would deterrnine the distribution
J.J."'-H~f
to
third . . . n-r..- ..
amongst Rllssia and the United
34
States.

Black's Law Dictionary's definitiol1 as
to
appropriate course of __ "'.,. . ., . . . .
If the Russia11 authorities would have
had knowledge of at least a substantial
a collision, they might perhaps
not have been able to Inove Cosnlos
lout of the
but
\\lould
certainly have been able to infonn
Iridiunl that a mal10euvre might be
A failure to then do so
would ccrtaill1y establish a large
measure of fault on their
as
can be glanced, however, the Russian
authorities ~o far have denied any
knowledg(~
potential for a
collision.
the
of
(dis)proof shifts again to the US side.
Not only is the US space surveillance
network generally considered to be the
most advanced and sophisticated
according to a
article aerospace analyst T.S. Kelso
found that the Pentagoll's public data
showed that the two satellites would
have missed each other by a mere 584
Inetres whilst
error ran
into several kilometres. Also lTIoving
to this second level of analysis,
still seell1S to lead to the
unsatisfactory result of making one
of
perfectly
satellite in its nOlninal orbit liable for
dalnage caused to another satellite,
which had stopped having
apparent
useful hlnction many years earlier and
left
as a
conseqllencc long since.
One lnight of course argue that all this
at least for the tilne
mere
theory, since both parties have desisted
any formal
and are actually
looking for a de-escalation of any
32
threatening dispute. Rllssia does not
wish to pursue a somewhat p~rverse
claim for dalnage to a useless piece of
junk, whilst
has
announced it had a spare ready anyway

.L..L .......

....

"""'-JJ.J.J."...........
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example, use the last bit of on-board
fuel to relegate tIle satellite to a
j-un.kyard orbit or to l1ave it de-orbited.
Article IX ~f the Outer Space Treaty~
the single relevant clause in this
context (al1d of course ill force for
Russia in 1993 al1d 1995) lTIerely
required states to "conduct ex.ploration
of them so as to avoid their harmful
contalllination"~ which is at best an
obligatioll of effort rather tl1a11 an
obligation of result, of t1J~ing in good
faith rather then being obliged to avoid
any harmful contan1ination.
Only ill recent years 11as tl1is
fundamental lack of legal limitations to
the 'freedom to create space debris'
started to be curbed - thanks, in first
instance, to the Inter-Agency Space
Debris
(~oordination
Committee
(lADe) and th.e guidelines it had
drafted by Scptenlbcr 2007. 35 Though
still in voluntary' fashion, the
guidelines on debris
mitigation
included strong recomnlendations to
move satellites nearing their elld of life
to junkyard orbits or to dc-orbit them;
guidelil1es which are novy being
implemented as licensing requirements
for private operators ill some states as
well as having been. lifted to a higher
level of visibility, political and
ultinlately also legal relevance by
nlcans of a UN Resolutiol1. 36
Whilst
such
developnlents
are
obviollsly to be applauded., they
equally Ob\T101ISly COnfirlTI that back in
1993 or 1995 nothit1g of the so]1
existed - in other \vords, only with
great difficulty could Russia be held to
ha\le fallen short of "deviation from
[applicable] prudence or dllty'~ or
"failure to maintain some [applicable]
standard of conduct".
Even no\v, there is no apl"licable clearcut and conlprehensive legal obligation
of the sort under illternational law.
Once such an obligation \vould become
established beyond doubt - whether by

In sum: the absence of a clear, or at
least \vorkable definition of 'fault' that
takes into C011sideration the specifics of
space activities and satellites, such as
the virtllal absence of possibilities of
OIl-site investigatiollS looking for the
'real" causes of the accident, ITIig}lt still
tum Ollt to present a major problem if
sonlcwhcre in the future debris
traceable to the Cosnl0s 225] -Iridiunl
33 collision causes damage to a third
state's satellite.

5. The issue of 'sQace debris'
A final important elel11ent in the
discussion on \vhom to blall1c prilllarily
for the collision, not discussed so far,
concerned the element of "deviation
from prudence or duty" or "failure to
Inail1tain some stalldard of COl1duct", in
the ternlS of Black's Law Dictiol1ary.
Sonlc comnlcntators have SOllght to
circumvent the countcr- intuitive result
of an application of the Liability
Convention to the letter by seeking the
fault of Russia in the lucre fact that it
had 'allo\vcd' its satellite to run out of
control ill the first place, thus creating a
piece of space debris and aln10st
'willingly' accepting the risk it nlight
later on cause SOlne damage. Indeed,
had Russia by doing so violated
applicable rules of international law,
the step to declaring it conseqllently
liable for the harmful consequences of
its acts ~rould have been relatively
sn1a11.
However, even apart frolll the lack of
clarity abollt \vhcthcr the disablc111cnt
of tI1e (~oslnos 2251 back in
(presumably) 1995 was a sudden and
unforeseen event or vvhether the
operators had seen it COining, back in
1995, let alone i11 1993 wIlen COSlll0S
2251 was launched., there was no such
thing as a "duty" or "standard of
COllduct" requiring Russia to, for
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international
law-orie11ted
liability
regil11e back on the table.
In Vie\\l of the absence so far of damage
caused to the 'real' third parties (that is
beyond
United
Iridiunl
Russia), the Ljability Convention has
not been invoked yet~ but whether it
would stand the test once it lrvou/cl be, is
still a matter of grave doubt. 'The cow
may 110t
have left
ban1, but it
sellses the opening and tilne may be
rU11nlllg out to close the barn door.

international treaty or as a matter of
undisputed customary' international law
the Liability COllvention could
considerably gain in effectiveness or
'Iloot_ .... applicability, since
'fault'
could be established by criteria that
make sellse in the particular context of
activities.
In sum: the collision also confirlTIS that
is
value
further
'juridifying't obligations to lTIinimise
both tlle
of space debris and
its potentially hannful consequences~ if
only to allow the Liability (~onvention
to work more
in
context
of fault.
... ..l'- ........

Elldnotes
See "It Finally Happened
.Two
Satellites Collide!", Launcllspace Staff,
Special
for SpaceDaily.colll, 11
February 2009. The Report refers to
some 300 new detectable fragments;
the US statement delivered at the 46th
Session of tIle UNCOPUOS Scielltific
and Technical Subconlmittee of
February to some 700.
1.

6. Concluding remarks
Whilst the above analysis may not even
taken on board all
facts
or even facts which as such could not
be subject to cOITectiollS as a

it
already shows that the very first
seemingly clean-cut case for applying
the Liability Convention does no
appear so clean-cut anYIllorc. Further
encounters of the third-party
kind will, unfortunately but inevitably,
becol11e lTIOre rather than
likely,
and hence l11ake tIle question of
whether the Liability Convention stood
test at this
rather relevant.
Especially where 'fault' COlnes into
in view of the specifics of space
activities, the lack of any definitioll
takillg these into account and the lack
binding
to
measure 'fault' against~ the Liability
Convention certainly leaves much to be
desired in tenllS of solving the problelTI,
theoretical as it may SeelTI for tIle tilne

. See
of 13 June
1994, p. 2. Cosmos 2251 was
erroneously referred to as
2551 here.
. See statement, "Russial1 and
satellites collide", BBC "News, 12
February
2009,
with
AFP
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/natu
re/7885051.stln.
Sec ST/SG/S.ER ..E/332, of 19 MarcIl
] 998, p. 2.

4.

Convention on International Liability
for Dall1age Caused by Space Objects
(hereafter
Liability
Convention),
London/Moscow/Washington, done
March 1972, entered i11to force 1
SeptelTIber 1972; 961 UNTS 187; TIAS
7762;
2389; UKTS 1974
5.

The situation is further aggravated by
the key involvement of a
party
on one side of tIle dispute
bringing
discussions on a lTIOre private
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Art.

I(c), Liability Convention;

16; Cmnd. 5068; ATS 1975 No.5; 10
TLM
(1971).

14.

The
Liability
C~onvention~s
applicatioll would be triggered by
damage "caused by ( ... ) space
(cf.
II, III;
II
deals witll dalnage caused in outer
itself and
III with
caused in airspace or on the ground),
whereas
clainls
only
involving
and
a
state essentially are exclllded frolll the
of the application
the
Convention (cf. Art. VII(a»).

See
ftlrther
of this
argument e.g. the author's Sovereignty
versus Space - Public Law and Private
Launch
15.

SingalJOre .Journal

Cf. Art. 3], esp. sub (1), Vienna
on the
Vienna, done 23 May 1969, entered into
force 27
1980; 1] 55 UNTS
331; UKTS 1980 No. 58; Cmnd. 48] 8;
ATS J974 No.2; 8 ILM 679 (1969); on
the interpretation of treaty
'''''·0.
16.

7

for the discussion on the
fundalnental
relationship
between
and
object"
extensively
S.
Gorove,
Issues
Pertaining to the Legal Definition
(1995)~

"".1LL'U ..

the
Private
I . Cf.
Enterprise and Public Interest in the
'Ezlro/Jean Spac'escape (1998), 130-1
t

on
on
Activities,
]982: 963, ] 8 Noven1ber ] 982;
National
of
World, Vol. I (2001), at 398~ Space
La\\' Basic Legal Docunlcnts, E.II.I;
flir
LuftlInd
Weltraulnrecht (1987), at 1]; 134-7 011
the United
Space
18 July 1986, 1986 Chapter 38;
National Space Legislation of the
World, Vol. 1 (200 1)~ at
Law-Basic Legal Documents,E.I: 36
Zeitschrifl
Luft- und Weltraunrrccht
(1987), at 12; 142-4 on Russia's Law of
the Russian Federation 011 Space
Activities,
5663-1,
August
1993, effective 6 October 1993:
National
of
World, Vol. T (2001), at 101; and 14951 on South Africa's Space Affairs
Act, 6
1993, assel1tcd to on
23 JtUle 1993, No. 84 of 1993; Statutes
the Republic of South Africa Trade
and Industry, Issue No. 27, 21-44;
Natiollal Space Legislation of the
World, Vol. I (2001), at 413.

] 36-45.

x. Art XI(2), Liability COllvention.
9

Artt

XIV,

Liability

Convention.
See the Statement of Claim by
Space La"v
Basic Legal
: further
B.A.
Hurwitz"l Reflections on the Cosmos
Incident,
the
IO.

Cariada~

Thir(v-Seco/1c{ Colloqlfiunl on the
~f'Outer Space (1990),350-3.

La~v

11

See
Protocol
Between
the
Goveffil11cnt
C~anada
the
Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics of 2 April 1981;
Law
Legal Doculnents,
A.IX.2.2.
12.

International

(2001),38-44.

F't<:l1"'t'1f'lrro

Object", 2
(Jnd l-)pace Journal

0.1'

See Art. VIII, Liability Convelltion.

VIII(l), Liability
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1~

. Sec. 70104(a)(I) & (2), C0111lnercial
Space Transportation - C~Ol1llnercial
Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C~.
7010 I (1994); elnphasis added. Cf.
also sub (3) & (4).

touching upon the definition as such of
either states as a launching state or
even upon the obligation of either state
to answer relevant claims under the
Liability Convention.

19

Art. V(2), Liability Convention; cf.
also Art. V( 1), providing that "a State
from whose territory or facility a space
object is launched shall be regarded as
a participant in a joint launching."

See
already
Sec.
301,
Communicatiolls Act, 19 June 1934; 47
U.S.C. 151 (1988); 48 Stat. 1064;
rcquiring a license for anyone to "use or
operate
any
apparatus
for
the
translnission of (... ) communications or
signals by radio" from the territory or
quasi-territory of tIle United States.
Though the Comnlunications Act has
beell thoroughly anlcndcd ovcr tIle
years, this clause has relnained
fundamentally unchanged.

22.

The main exception here might well
have been the applicatiol1 of US export
regulations, notably the infamous
ITAR's (International Trade in Anns
Regulations) under the Arll1s Export
C~ontrol Act of 1976, 22 U.S.(~. 2751;
al1d the United States MUllitions List
(USML), 22 C.F.R. 121, last revised 1
April 2008; for the purpose of ensuring
that the launch of the satellite outside
the US docs not lead to highlysensitive dual-use know-how falling
into the hands of those representing a
security threat to the United States.
However, in view of the complexity of
this issue as well its non-relevance for
the liability and launching state issues,
this will not be discussed preselltly.
23.

Also for application of the
Registration Convention (Convention
on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (hereafter Registration
Convention), New Yark, done 14
January 1975, entered into forcc 15
September 1976; 1023 UNTS 15; TIAS
8480; 28 UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70;
Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No.5; 14 ILM
43 (1975)) the exact same notion of
'launching state' triggcrs the relevant
obligations; cf. Artt. I(a), II, IV.

20

24. At least, this is the situation under
international law; the scenario whereby
Russia could apply donlestic law to
Iridium's possible liability as a
consequence of its satellitc being
launched from a Russian launch
facility - and thus supposedly having
acquired
the
Rllssian
license
inandatory for those activities; cf. Art.
9(2), Law of the Russian Federation on
Space Activities - is not further
investigated here.

The two states have conclllded a
bilateral agreelnent by llleans of which
Russia agrees to reimburse Kazakhstan
for any international clailTI addresscd
to the latter as a conscquencc of a
laul1ch from Bajkonour; see Treaty
bctween the Govenl1nent of Russia alld
the G.overnment of the Republic of
Kazakhstan on the Leasing of the
Baikonour-ColTIplex, of 10 Decelllber
1994; also M. Hoskova, The 1994
Baikonour Agreements in Operation,
Proceedings 0.[ the ForfJJ-Second
C-lolloquium on the La11' o.f'Outer Space
(2000), 265-8. Of coursc, this is only
an inter se arrangelnent, not capable of

21.

Black's LalV D;ctionaly
cd.)(2004), 641; elllphasis added.

25
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Black'L't' Latv
ed.)(2004), 933.

Dictionar.J"

27

ComJ)anion

26

The

O.~ford

~4mericanLall'

(8 th

35

lADe Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines, IADC-02-0 1, Revision 1,
Septenlber 2007.

to
Space Debris Mitigation Gliidelincs
of the United Nations Coml11ittee on

(2002), 297; emphasis

36.

added.

the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
by
General
(A/62/20)
endorsed
Assembly Resolution 62/217, of 21
December 2007; A/RES/62/217.

In an A
' d P ress report
Ssoclate
(Borenstein, Birch), 13 February 2009.

'E
~.

19

.... It should be noted that Art. III,
Liability Convention, in this context
refers to "its falllt or the fault of
.persons for whom it is responsible",
which might nlake the United States
liable once one would accept that
procurement
leads
to
private
qualification of the state \vhose
C0111pany did so procure the launch as a

launching state, as discussedbcforc.
30. Under the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, Art. 32 allows for
ll1eans of interpretation suppleJnentary
to terms, object, purpose and context
of the treaty in case application of the
latter leads to "to a restilt which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable'''.

See "Satellite crash prediction is
plagued with u'nccrtainty"', New
Scientist, 13 Febnlary 2009, at
http://\VW\V.newscie11tist.cOln/aliicle/do
16592 -sate Iii tc-crash-predi ction-isplagued-wi th-uncertainty.html.
31.

Formally, of course, the Liability
Convention would allow either party
until 10 February 2010, a full year
after the col1isio11, to assert their clail11;
see Art. XCI).

32.

Art. IV(1), Liability Convention;
el11phasis added.

33.

34

Cf.
Art.
Convention.

IV(2),

Liability
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